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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BERTHA M. McCLURE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
EDWIN E. DOWELL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10042 
BRIEF O·F RESPO·NDENT 
Appeal from the Third District Court for 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
Hon. A. H. Ellett, District Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. This appeal presents the question as to whether or 
not in an action under the Utah Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act to collect past-due installments 
of child support, which have accrued pursuant to an un-
modified Alabama divorce decree, the accrued install-
ments are entitled to full faith and c·redit under the United 
States Constitution or can be canceled or reduced by the 
Utah Courts because the defendant's visitation rights, pur-
suant to a separation agreement, have been violated. 
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b. The lower court held that the violation of the 
defendant's visitation rights was not a valid legal defense 
and entered judgment for the net amount of the unpaid 
arrcarages plus interest at the legal rate. 
c. The respondent essentially agrees with the facts 
as stated by the appellant, but believes they should be 
supplemented as follows: 
(1) The decree of absolute divorce entered on Feb-
ruary 6, 1957, by the Circuit Court of Russell County, 
Alabama, has never been modified by order of any court. 
(Tr. 20) 
(2) ) The decree of divorce awarded custody of the 
two minor children to the plaintiff, and ordered the de-
fendant to pay for their support the sum of $150.00 each 
month. (Exh. D-1) 
(3) The decree of divorce does not refer to or in-
corporate any of the provisions of the separation agreement 
entered into between the parties on January 24, 1957. 
(Exh. D-2; Tr. 19) 
4. The decree of divorce makes no mention what-
soever with respect to any visitation rights of the father. 
(Exh. D-1) 
( 5) The defendant resided in Utah during the time 
when the child support payments accrued. (Tr. 20; App. 
Br. 5) 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS WHICH 
HAVE ACCRUED PURSUANT TO AN UN-
MODIFIED ALABAMA DIVORCE DECREE ARE 
CONSIDERED FINAL AND VESTED AND ARE 
PROTECTED FROM ANY REDUCTION BY THE 
COURTS OF A SISTER STATE BY THE FULL FAITH 
AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
POINT II 
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE PAST-DUE IN-
STALLMENTS OF CHILD SUPPORT ARE NOT 
PROTECTED BY THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
CLAUSE, THE VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
VISITATION RIGHTS DOES NO·T LEGALLY EX-
CUSE OR DISCHARGE HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY 
ACCRUED CHILD SUPPO·RT. 
POINT III 
INTEREST O·N PAST-DUE INSTALLMENTS OF 
CHILD SUPPORT ACCUMULATES UNTIL THE 
ARREARAGES ARE PAID. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS WHICH 
HAVE ACCRUED PURSUANT TO AN UN-
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~lODIFIED ALABAMA DIVORCE DECREE ARE 
CONSIDERED FINAL AND VESTED AND ARE 
PROTECTED FROM ANY REDUCTION BY THE 
COURTS OF A SISTER STATE BY THE FULL FAITH 
AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
The full faith and credit clause of the United States 
Constitution provides in part: 
uFull Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State." U.S. Const. Art 
IV, Sec. I. 
Pursuant to this clause, the United States Congress 
has enacted a statute which provides that the judicial 
proceedings of the court of any state ((shall have the same 
full faith and credit in every court within the United 
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by 
law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Pos-
session from which they are taken." 28 USCA 1738, 62 
Stat. 947 ( 1948) 
The appellant evidently assumes that the full faith 
and credit clause is inapplicable to the present case be-
cause the past-due installments of child support had not 
been reduced to judgment in Alabama. This erroneous 
assumption is made without reference or citation to any 
statute or case law. (App. Br. 7, 8) 
The United States Supreme Court in Sistare vs. 
Sistare, 218 US 1, 30 S. Ct. 682, 54 L. Ed. 905 (1910), 
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held that past-due installments of alimony or child sup-
port, when they are considered final and unmodifiable by 
the state originally entering the degree, are protected by 
the full faith and credit clause regardless of whether or 
not such installments have been reduced to a final 
judgment. 
In the Sistare case, the plaintiff, by the Supreme 
Court of the State of New York, was granted a separation 
from bed and board from her husband, and the defendant 
was ordered to pay the sum of $22.50 per week for the 
support of herself and the maintenance and education of 
their minor child. No payments were made by the de-
fendant. Five years later the wife commenced an action 
in Connecticut to recover the amount then in arrears. 
The arrearages had not been reduced to final judgment 
in New York. The court held on page 91 0-11 : 
((First, that, generally speaking, where a de-
cree is rendered for alimony and is made payable in 
future instalments, the right to such instalments 
becomes absolute and vested upon becoming due, 
and is therefore protected by the full faith and 
credit clause, provided no modification of the de-
cree has been made prior to the maturity of the 
instalments, since, as declared in the Barber Case, 
(alimony decreed to a wife in a divorce of separa-
tion from bed and boa,rd is as much a debt of 
record, until the decree has been recalled, as any 
other judgment for money is.' Second, that this 
general rule, however, does not obtain where, by 
the law of the state in which a judgment for future 
alimony is rendered, the right to demand and re-
ceive such future alimony is discretionary with the 
court which rendered the decree, to such an extent 
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that no absolute or vested right attaches to receive 
the instalments ordered by the decree to be paid, 
even although no application to annul or modify 
the decree in respect to alimony had been made 
prior to the instalments becoming due. 
ult follows, therefore, from the statement 
which we have made of the case, that the New 
York judgment which was relied upon came within 
the general rule, and, therefore, that the action of 
the supreme court of errors of Connecticut in re-
fusing to enforce it was in conflict with the full 
faith and credit clause, unless it be, as a result of the 
law of the state of New York, the judgment for 
future alimony in that state, even as to past-due 
instalments, was so completely within the discretion 
of the courts of that state as to bring it within the 
exceptional rule embodied in the second proposi-
tion." 
If there were any doubt as to the type of judgment 
which the court said was entitled to full faith and credit 
in the Sistare case, this was laid to rest by the Court's 
statement in Barber vs. Barber, 323 US 77, 65 S. Ct. 137, 
89 L. Ed. 82 ( 1944). The Supreme Court stated on 
page 84: 
uln Sistare vs. Sistare, supra (218 US 16, 17, 
54 L. ed. 910, 911, 30 S Ct 682 28 LRA (NS) 
1 0 6 8, 2 0 Ana Cas 1 0 61 ) , this Court considered 
whether a decree for future alimony brought to a 
sister state, was entitled to full faith and credit as 
to installments which had accrued, but which had 
not been reduced to a further judgment. The Court 
held that a decree for future alimony is, under the 
Constitution and the statute, entitled to credit as 
to past-due installments, if the right to them is 
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(absolute and vested,' even though the decree might 
be modified prospectively by future orders of the 
court." (Emphasis added) 
Therefore, under the Sistare and Ba.rber decisions, if 
the right under Alabama law to past-due installments of 
child support is ((absolute and vested," they must be given 
ttfull faith and credit" and are protected from any modifi-
cation or reduction by the Utah courts. 
Under Alabama law, past-due installments of child 
support, as they accrue, are absolutely vested and cannot 
be modified or reduced by any court of law or equity. 
The first Alabama case which considered this ques-
tion was Armstrong vs. Green, 260 Ala. 39, 68 So.2d 834 
( 19 53 ) . In this case, an Alabama court gran ted a di-
vorce between the parties and awarded custody of the 
minor child to the mother. The defendant was ordered 
to pay $3 5 a month child support. The plaintiff subse-
quently brought a petition for a rule to show cause why 
the defendant should not be held in contempt for failure 
to make the monthly payments. The plaintiff contended 
that the defendant was guilty of contempt and that the 
accrued child support payments under the divorce decree 
were vested and beyond the court's power to destroy or 
release. The minor child, except for the first year after 
the divorce, had been in the custody of the plaintiff's par-
ents, who had supported the child without any expectation 
or desire for reimbursement. 
The Supreme Court of Alabama initially held that 
since the child had been in the custody of a third person 
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who had supported the child, the mother could not re-
cover the amounts of child support which had accrued. 
1--Iowever, on rehearing, the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama reversed this position and held the father in contempt 
and awarded to the mother the amount of the accrued 
child support payments. The court, on rehearing, stated 
at page 839: 
uon application for rehearing LAWSON, 
SIMPSON, GOO,DWYN, MERRILL, and CLAY-
TON, JJ., are of the opinion that a rehearing should 
be granted, so as to reverse the holding of the lower 
court on the question of contempt of Comer F. 
Green. This position is based on the theory that 
installment payments decreed in a divorce for sup-
port and education of the minor child of a marriage 
become final judgments as of the dates due and 
may be collected as other judgments. In support 
of this view they cite the following authorities: 
Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 54 L. Ed. 
905; (other citations omitted.) 
* * * 
uAccordingly, the decree of the lower court 
is reversed and the cause remanded on that phase 
of the decree of the lower court and it is held that 
Comer F. Green became guilty of contempt upon 
failure to comply with the decree of the court 
when he failed to pay the accrued installments 
provided for in the decree. The court will enter 
an order giving Comer F. Green such additional 
time as it deems advisable to comply with the 
decree of divorce as to payments which ·are in 
arrears for the maintenance and support of the 
minor child, Jacqueline Green." 
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In Wood vs. Wood, 154 So.2d 661 (Ala. 1963), the 
divorce decree provided that the defendant husband pay 
to the plaintiff the sum of $6 per week for the support 
and maintenance of their minor child. No payments were 
made after January 1, 1946. The plaintiff brought an 
action to collect the arrearages which amounted to 
$10,3 20. The trial court entered judgment for only 
$3,477. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama, stated 
on page 663: 
((The question arising on this appeal can be 
determined by the consideration of one issue, viz., 
does the equity court have the power to retro-
actively modify accrued arrearages of child sup-
port payments due under a decree of divorce a 
vinculo matrimonii? 
uO,ur cases clearly enunciate the rule that in-
stallment payments decreed in a divorce for sup-
port and education of the minor child of a marriage 
become final judgments as of the dates due and 
m.ay be collected as other judgments. Armstrong 
vs. Green, 260 Ala. 39 (Rehearing Op., p. 45), 68 
So.2d 834, 839. And installments which mature 
before a petition to modify is filed are immune 
from change. Scott vs. Scott, 265 Ala. 208, 90 
So.2d 813, and cases cited. Such is the status of 
the accrued weekly payments during the minority 
of the child while not self-supporting." 
((There is force behind the rule, since such a 
decree or judgment will not be enforcible in the 
Courts of our sister states unless the judgment is 
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final or not subject to modification as to those 
payments accrued. In other words, a judgment 
subject to modification is not final, and the Courts 
of a sister state are not bound to afford the judg-
ment full faith and credit under the United States 
Constitution. Green v. Green, 239 Ala. 407, 198 
So. 549; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 682, 
54 L. Ed. 905. 
uwe are not altogether pleased with the con-
clusion here attained, because the facts present a 
strong appeal for sympathy, but in the face of the 
unswerving judicial precedents adverted to above 
u.:c are left under no alternative but to order a 
reversal of the decree. Perhaps the Legislature in its 
wisdom might enact some remedial legislation for 
future cases. This case brings squarely into focus 
a probable inequity, the correction of which is 
more properly addressed to the Legislature than to 
the courts." (Emphasis added) 
In Mel1.-'i11 vs. Purr, 155 So.2d 593, (Ala. 1963), the 
divorce decree ordered the husband to pay $125 per 
month to the wife for the support of their minor children. 
The plaintiff brought an action to recover past-due child 
support payments. The defendant contended that he had 
given money directly to the children and had otherwise 
expended money for their benefit in excess of the amounts 
of the past-due child support payments. The trial court 
sustained this defense against the wife. 
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed, stating on 
pages 594-95: 
uw e are of the opinion that the court erred 
in giving to the husband credit for sums not paid 
to the wife." 
* * * 
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((The decree is reversed and the cause re-
manded for entry of a decree requiring the husband 
to make full payment to the wife as provided for 
by the decree of divorce with performance by hus-
band to be enforced by appropriate process of the 
court." 
The above decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court 
make it clear that past-due installments of child support 
as they accrue are absolute and are vested in the mother 
and cannot be modified or reduced. The fact that payment 
has been made directly to the children, or that the mother 
has not had custody of the children or expended money 
for their support have been rejected as defenses by the 
Alabama Supreme Court. Certainly a defense based on 
the violation of visitation rights contained in a prior 
separation agreement, not even incorporated or referred 
to by the divorce decree, would not be recognized by the 
Alabama courts. 
The Wood case, supra p. 9, specifically indicates 
that the judicial precedents of Alabama give such accrued 
installments the necessary finality to bring them within 
the protection of the full faith and credit clause. If there 
were any question as to the interpretation of the Alabama 
law· it would have to be resolved in favor of the finality of 
the accrued installments. The Supreme Court in the 
Sistare case, supra p. 4, stated on page 912: 
((But it is equally certain that nothing in this 
language expressly gives power to revoke or modify 
an installment of alimony which had accrued prior 
to the making of an application to vary or modify, 
and every reasonable implication must be resorted 
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to against the existence of such power, in the ab-
sence of clear language manifesting an intention to 
confer it." (Emphasis added). 
In view of the above decisions of the Alabama 
Supreme Court and the standard of interpretation as set 
forth in the Sistare case, the chid support payments as 
they accrued under the Alabama divorce decree are :final 
and vested and are protected by the full faith and credit 
clause from any reduction by the Utah courts. 
Contrary to the requirements of the full faith and 
credit clause, the defendant erroneously contends that had 
the plaintiff brought this action for arrearages in New 
York, the state of her domicile, she would not have been 
able to recover. In support of this contention, the de-
fendant cites the case of Goldner vs. Goldner, 309 N.Y. 
675, 128 NE 2d 321 (1955). This case does not support 
this contention. The Goldner case, as indicated in the 
lower court opinion, 135 NYS2d 337, 284 App. Div. 961 
{1954), was an action for the enforcement of a New York 
separation judgment entered prior to a Florida divorce 
decree. The court on page 328 stated: 
uwe assume but do not decide that the original 
New York separation judgment is still entitled to 
enforcement .... We view as improvident, how-
ever, the order made herein punishing the defendant 
for contempt when it appears that the New York 
judgment contained a provision by implication that 
the children would be available in this State for 
visitation by the husband." (Emphasis added) 
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Under the New York statutes a court may annul or 
modify, retrospectively, alimony and child support 
arrearages of a New York decree.1 
Where suit is brought for arrearages under a foreign 
divorce decree, such as the one in the instant case, the New 
York courts give full faith and credit to the decree and 
would not sustain any asserted defense of violation of 
visitation privileges. 
In Sterns vs. Stevens, 204 NYS 2d 623, 11 AD 2d 726 
(App. Div., 1960), the court on page 625 stated: 
((The Florida decree did not require the plain-
tiff to keep and maintain the daughter in the State 
of New York; nor was the defendant's obligation 
to support the daughter therein conditioned upon 
plaintiff's maintenance of the daughter within the 
lMcKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 14, Domestic Relations 
Law, Sees. 240 and 244 provide: 
Section 240: "In any action or proceeding brought (1) to annul a 
marriage or to declare the nullity of a joint marriage, or (2) for a separa-
tion, or (3) for a divorce, ... the court must give such direction, between 
the parties, for the custody, care, education, and maintenance of any child 
of the parties, as, in the court's discretion, justice require, ... Such direc-
tion may require the payment of a sum or sums of money either directly 
to the wife or to third persons for goods or services furnished for such 
child .... Upon the application of either the husband or the wife, or of 
any other person or party having the care, custody, and control of such 
child pursuant to such judgment or order, . . . the court may annul or 
modify any such direction. 
Section 244: "Where the husband in an action for divorce, separation or 
annulment . . . makes default in paying any sum of money as required 
by the judgment or order directing the payment thereof, the court in its 
discretion may make an order directing the entry of judgment for the 
amount of such arrears, or for such part thereof as justice requires, having 
a regard to the circumstances of the respective parties .... " (Emphasis 
added) 
See also, VanDusen vs. VanDusen, 17 NYS 2d 96, 258 App. Div. 1020 (1940); 
Eisinger vs. Eisinger, 26 NYS 2d 22, 261 App. Div. 1031 (1941). 
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State of New York. If plaintiff has violated the 
terms of the decree with respect to the defendant's 
rights of visitation, the remedy lies in a motion to 
amend said decree with respect to the provisions 
requiring him to make payments for support. In 
the absence of such a modification, the plaintiff's 
conduct in maintaining the daughter in Canada 
furnished no reason for defendant's release from his 
obligation to support his daughter as directed by 
said decree." 
In Rosmini vs. Rosmini, 230 NYS 2d 319 (N.Y. City 
Ct., 1962), the court on page 321 stated: 
ttThe defendant in his answer alleges in sub-
stance and effect that plaintiff deprived him of his 
rights of visitation as provided for in the divorce 
decree by reason of the plaintiff's sojourn to Cali-
fornia with their daughter for two years, and that 
she thereby waived her rights to the accrued pay-
ments thereunder and should be estopped from 
seeking same. The defendant also contends in his 
affidavit in opposition that this was a violation of 
his rights of visitation as set out in a separation 
agreement made prior to the issuance of said divorce 
decree, and that the terms and provisions of such 
agreement were to remain in full force and effect 
and to survive the entry of such subsequent decree 
of divorce. 
nHowever, as the plaintiff is not relying upon 
the separation agreement and as the payments called 
for by the decree are not conditioned upon de-
fendant's right of visitation as allowed therein, and 
as the divorce decree makes no reference whatever 
to the separation agreement, the defense that there 
was a violation of such right either under the 
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separation agreement or the decree is insufficient as 
a defense to the action. 
ult generally appears that in cases of this char-
acter based upon foreign marital decrees that an 
alleged breach thereof would not constitute a de-
fense in an action brought in the courts of this 
state for accrued alimony under the foreign decree 
if the right to such payment has vested and that any 
remedy based on such facts must be found in the 
jurisdiction where the decree was rendered. Such 
is the weight of authority in this jurisdiction." 
(Citation of New York cases omitted). 
The fact that alimony or child support arrearages 
are protected by the full faith and credit clause1 was recog-
nized by this court in Westerfield vs. Coop, 6 Utah 2d 262, 
311 P2d 787 ( 1957). In the Westerfield case full faith 
and credit was given to past due installments of alimony 
and support under a California divorce decree. 
Under Alabama law, the child support payments, 
pursuant to the decree of divorce between the parties, 
become absolutely vested as they accrued and are not 
subject to modification or reduction because of any viola-
tion of the defendant's visitation rights. 
The Utah Courts are constitutionally compelled to 
consider the accrued child support payments as vested 
and final and give to them the same faith and credit uas 
they have by law or usage in the courts of (Alabama) from 
which they are taken." The trial court was correct in 
giving judgment for the unpaid child support payments. 
lSee also, Decree For Alimony In Installments As Within Full Faith And 
Credit Provision, 157 A.LR. 170. 
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POINT II 
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE PAST-DUE IN-
STALLMENTS OF CHILD SUPPORT ARE NOT 
PROTECTED BY THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
CLAUSE, THE VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
VISITATION RIGHTS DOES NOT LEGALLY EX-
CUSE OR DISCHARGE HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY 
ACCRUED CHILD SUPPORT. 
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the argu-
ments set forth in Point I, with respect to the application 
of the full faith and credit clause, completely dispose of 
this particular case. However, even assuming, for pur-
poses of argument, that the past-due installments of child 
support are not protected by the full faith and credit 
clause, the defendant's contention that the violation of 
his visitation rights legally discharges or excuses his obliga-
tion to pay child support cannot be sustained. 
Assuming that the Utah courts could ignore the 
requirements of the full faith and credit clause, the de-
fendant's duties of support would be determined by Utah 
law. 
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act, Section 77-61a-7, Utah Code Ann., provides: 
rrchoice of Law.-Duties of support applicable 
under this act are those imposed or imposable under 
the laws of any state where the obligor was present 
during the period for which support is sought. The 
obligor is presumed to have been present in the 
responding state during the period for which sup-
port is sought until otherwise shown." 
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The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Baker vs. 
Baker, 119 Utah 37, 224 P2d 192 ( 1950), rejected as a 
defense to an action to recover past-due installments of 
child support the fact that a husband's visitation rights 
had been violated. 
In the Baker case, as in this case, the defendant con-
tended that the plaintiff was not entitled to past-due 
installments of child support because his visitation rights 
had been violated and the children removed by the plain-
tiff to another jurisdiction without his permission. The 
defendant, in his brief, admits that in the Baker case uthe 
father failed in his attempt to assert as an excuse for evad-
ing his own social, moral and legal obligations, a technical 
breach' by the mother of the visitation provisions when 
she had moved the children to Oregon where were her 
other children, relatives, and friends." (App. Br. 7) 
(Emphasis added) 
The defendant attempts to distinguish the Baker case 
from the present one by asserting that in the Baker case 
there was a ((technical breach" of the visitation rights; 
whereas, by inference in this case, there was something 
more. 
In the Baker case the ((technical breach" of visitation 
rights resulting in the plaintiff being held in contempt of 
court for the removal of the children from the state of 
Utah. However, notwithstanding this finding of con-
tempt, the Court still held that the plaintiff was entitled 
to the past-due installments of child support. 
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It should be noted that in the Baker case the de-
fendant's visitation rights were based on the divorce de-
cree and still the asserted defense was rejected. In the 
present case, the defendant's visitation rights are based on 
a prior separation agreement not incorporated or even 
referred to by the later divorce decree. 
Since the Baker case is squarely against the defendant's 
position, the defendant relies heavily on the case of Larsen 
vs. Larscu, 5 Utah 2d 244, 300 P2d 596 (1956), which 
involved a completely different fact situation than the 
one presented here. 
In the Larseu case, the husband on two separate occa-
sions had inquired of his former wife with respect to 
whether or not she would require him to make the child 
support payments in accordance with the court decree. 
The evidence was clear that on both occasions the plain-
tiff had represented to the defendant that she would not 
require him to make the payments and that the only thing 
she wanted was for him to ustay out of her life." 
The court on page 598 stated: 
uwhere the father's failure to make such pay-
ments was induced by her representations or actions 
and where as a result of such representations or 
actions the father has been lulled into failing to 
make such payments and into changing his position 
which he would not have done but for such repre-
sentations, and that as a result of such failure to pay 
and change in his conditions it will cause him great 
hardship and injustice if she is allowed to enforce 
the payment of such back installments, she may be 
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thereby estopped from enforcing the payment of 
such back installments." 
The plaintiff was estopped from recovering past child 
support payments because of a ((representation to de-
fendant that he would not be held accountable for the 
support money." See, Hall vs. Hall, 7 Utah 2d 413, 417, 
326 P2d 707 (1958). 
Certainly there are no facts in this case from which 
a court could find, nor does the defendant contend, that 
the plaintiff represented in any way that she no longer 
expected to ,receive the child support payments. 
Most of the courts which have considered the specific 
issue before the court in this case have held that a violation 
of a husband's visitation rights does not prevent the re-
covery of past-due installments of child support. 
In Zirkle vs. Zirkel, 202 Ind. 129, 172 NE 192 
(1930), cited in the Baker case, the court on page 194 
stated: 
ccin the case under consideration, it must be 
presumed that the order as to custody and support 
of the child was made for the benefit of the child. 
The child was and still is entitled to have the order 
executed. The order has not been modified or set 
aside .... 
ccif the appellant, without the consent of the 
court, or without right took the child out of the 
state, that act did not give the appellee any reason 
for refusing to make the weekly payments which 
the court had ordered." 
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The Baker case also cites in support of its decision 
the following cases: Feinberg vs. Feinberg, 72 N.J. Eq. 
810, 66 Ad. 610 (1907); Helmbold vs. Helmbold, 127 
Misc. 761, 217 NYS 379 (1926); Scbweig vs. Scbweig, 
122 App. Div. 787, 107 NYS 905 (1907); and Altschuler 
vs. Altschuler, 246 App. Div. 749, 284 NYS 93 (1935.) 
In the case of Kain vs. Kain, 318 P. 2d 955, 51 Wash. 
2d 387 (1957), the Supreme Court of Washington stated 
on page 956: 
ult is a well established rule in this state that 
liability for support-money payments is not con-
tingent upon the continued, convenient exercise of 
the right of visitation. The trial court did not have 
the power to modify the decree as to support-
money installments that accrued prior to the date 
of the order modifying the decree of divorce." 
Also, the cases of Lide vs. Lide, 201 Miss. 849, 30 
So.2d 51 ( 1947), and Lotz vs. Lotz, 327 Mich. 577, 42 
NW 2d 745 (1950), support the rule announced in the 
Baker case. 
POINT III 
INTEREST ON PAST-DUE INSTALMENTS OF 
CHILD SUPPORT ACCUMULATES UNTIL THE 
ARREARAGES ARE PAID. 
The installments of child support as they accrued 
became final and vested. Therefore, the granting of in-
terest on the arrear ages was proper. 
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In McKay vs. McKay, 13 Utah 2d 187, 370 P2d 358 
( 1962), the court stated on page 189: 
t(The court also erred in refusing to grant in-
terest on the accrued installments. As stated in 
Larsen vs. Larsen2 by this court: (It is the law in 
this state that the right to installment payments 
under a divorce decree vests upon the due date and 
that interest should be allowed until the payment 
is made. 
2Larsen vs. Larsen, 9 Utah 2d 160, 340 P2d 421, p. 422. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
MERLIN 0. BAKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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